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SUMMARY 
In this paper we consider optimal trading processes in economic systems. The analysis is based on 
accounting for irreversibility factor using wealth function concept. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades macro system theory has been extended to economic systems, see [1 – 3]. 
The crucial role here is played by the concept of resource value for a subsystem and the 
concept of exchange kinetics that is based on the differential of resource's value estimate by 
two economic systems. This technique makes it possible to determine the optimal behaviour 
of an economic intermediary operating in an irreversible economic system. In this framework 
economic intermediary is similar to a heat engine in thermodynamics. It controls its intensive 
variables (prices it orders to buyers and sellers). A direct economic exchange is always 
irreversible. However an exchange via an intermediary can be reversible, if the price for a 
resource used by an intermediary is intuitively close to resource's value estimate by a 
subsystem. In this case the rate of exchange will be intuitively close to zero. It is worth noting 
that if an exchange with the given rate is carried out via an intermediary then its 
irreversibility is lower than irreversibility of a direct exchange. If the duration of exchange or 
its rate is constrained then the problem of finding what are the prices an intermediary has to 
order to buyers and sellers in order to obtain maximal profit. 
We denote the cash holding of an intermediary as M and the value of its assets as F. 
PROFITABILITY AND CONDITIONS OF MINIMAL DISSIPATION 
We denote profitability as the maximal amount of cash that can be extracted from the system 
subject to given conditions. The system is denoted as a number (possibly one) of economic 
intermediaries and their environment. The constraints here play an important role. They can 
include the constraints on the final states of some of the economic agents, conditions for the 
intensive variables of the system, constraints on the exchange duration and others. These 
constraints reduce the profitability. If a system does not have an environment with constant 
estimates this definition of profitability will still be valid. 
The problem of finding the profitability does not have a solution for some systems without 
constraints. For example, profitability for a system with more than one economic reservoir 
(market) is unlimited, because an intermediary operating between them can generate an 
infinite profit. Note that profitability for a system with one reservoir, given initial state of an 
intermediary and no constraints on the duration of exchange represents an economic analogy 
of exergy in thermodynamics, which is widely used in engineering. 
Let us consider an economic system with k economic agents. Each agent has resource’s inventory 
Ni (i = 1, 2, …., k) and cash holding Mi. Resource's value estimate pi depends on Ni and Mi. 
Economic reservoir (system with constant resource value estimate p) can be one of subsystems. 
We assume that the system is closed with respect to resources. When there is contact between 
i-th and j-th subsystem then resource and capital flows between them nij and mij occur. 
Resource flow is directed from the system where its estimate is lower to the system where 
this estimate is higher. The capital flows in the opposite direction. 
If a system contains an intermediary (economic agent) then its objective is to organize 
resource exchange in such a way that it extracts capital M from the system. We will assume 
here that economic subsystems cannot exchange resources directly but only via an exchange 
though an intermediary. This intermediary regulated this exchange by setting up the prices for 
buyers and sellers. It controls this price setting to maximise M. The flows of buying and 
selling depend on the price c, offered by the intermediary to the -th subsystem and on the 
resource i value estimate for this subsystem pi. Thus, 
 ni = ni(pi, ci), ni = 0, p = c, sign(ni) = sign(p  c).  
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We denote the flow directed to the intermediary as positive and from it as negative. The flow 
is a monotonically increasing function of ci. The intermediary does not produce anything, it 
just resells what it purchased earlier. 
It is clear that the flow of capital 
 
i
iiiνiνννν ),(),( cpnccpm .  
The evolution of resource and capital inventories in the -th subsystem is described by the equations 
 ),(  cpnN ii 




 , M(0) = M0.  
As a rule, estimates pi(N, M) monotonically decrease when Ni increases and M is fixed. 
These estimates also are non-decreasing functions of M for fixed N. 
Next we will calculate how much money can be extracted by an intermediary over an infinity 
period and over a finite period of time for a system that includes economic reservoir and 
which lacks it. 
PROCESS DURATION IS NOT CONSTRAINED 
System with one reservoir 
The profit from reselling of a resource can be only extracted if initially the system is in a 
non-equilibrium state. That is, if vectors of resources' estimates p(0) for different subsystems 
have different values. The trading stops in equilibrium when estimates for all subsystems 
become equal to reservoir's estimates 
 0),( ii pNMp  , (i = 1, …., n and  = 1, …, m). (1) 
The maximum of the extracted profit corresponds to a minimum of the combined capital of 









 . (2) 
To achieve that objective, the intermediary buys resource using the lowest prices (estimates) 
from economic subsystems with estimates of the i-th resource below pi
0
, and resells it using 
the highest prices (estimates to economic subsystems with estimates higher than pi
0
. Both 
buying and selling processes are reversible and the increment of the combined wealth 
function is equal zero. The initial stocks of capital of economic subsystem is given and the 










 .  
We have m  n conditions (1), and m reversibility conditions to find the state of the system in 
equilibrium 
  SNMSNMS  )]0(),0([),( ,  = 1, …, m. (3) 
Equations (1) and (3) determine the equilibrium stocks of resource and capital. The extracted 
capital is equal to the difference between combined final and initial capital of the system 









 . (4) 
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System without reservoir 
In this case the condition of equilibrium (1) still holds but the vector of equilibrium estimates p
0
 









 , i = 1, …, n. (5) 
The system (1), (3), (5) determines (m + 1)n subsystem’s state variable in equilibrium. 
Naturally, equilibrium in a system with an intermediary 0N , N  is different from equilibrium 









 . (6) 
Example 
We consider an economic system which consists of an economic reservoir, a passive 
economic subsystem with finite capacity and an intermediary. Subsystem’s wealth has the 
following form 







The initial inventories of both resource and capital are 
 M(0) = 150, N1(0) = 20, N2(0) =30.  
and the equilibrium prices for economic reservoir are 
 p1
0
 = 5, p2
0
 = 2.  
The equilibrium states of subsystem equilibrium estimates are found from (1) and (3). The maximal 
amount of capital extractable from the system is determined by (4) and is equal to M = 20,95. 
Suppose that reservoirs’ prices are scaled with the coefficient k. The dependence of E(k) is 
shown in Figure 1. Let us emphasise that unlike the case of direct contact, the equilibrium 
state does not depend on the exchange kinetics for an exchange via an intermediary. 
 
Figure 1. The dependence of intermediary's profit on the economic reservoir's price scale. 
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LIMITED DURATION OF EXCHANGE 
We assume that the duration of exchange  is given. In this case an intermediary is forced to 
increase the prices offered to sellers above the equilibrium estimates pi. It is also forced to 
reduce the prices it offers to buyers below equilibrium estimates. This leads to an irreversible 
losses and reduces the amount of capital it is able to extract from the system. The maximal 
possible value of this capital E turns out to be lower than E1. Their difference 
 E = (E - E) > 0,  
describes the irreversibility of the trading. 
We shall call the capital loss above the capital loss in equilibrium (reduction in system's 
profitability) the capital dissipation 
  = n(p, c)(p – c). (7) 
For scalar exchange the dissipative losses are determine as 




d)( tt =  

0
d))(,( tcpcpn . (8) 
Condition of optimality for trading 
We consider an exchange between an intermediary and a finite-capacity economic subsystem. 
We want to find out how to control the price offered to buyers c in order to sell in given time 
 the given amount of resource N and to obtain the maximal price for it. It is clear that the 
optimal prices offered to the sellers would obey to the same conditions. In both case the 
capital of the finite-capacity subsystem M() must be minimal possible. 





MM   . (9) 
subject to 



























 = –n(p, c),  
on the interval (0, ) with a non-zero flow n. In the problem (9) – (12) it is required to find 
such function c*(N) that the increment of the economic intermediaries capital is minimal. 
The conditions of optimality of this problem are given by the Maximum principle. It is 





cH   .  

















, 0)( N , (13) 
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 .  
After eliminating  using (13) we obtain the condition of optimality for trading condition of 






















which determines c(N, M) up to the constant. This constant is to be found from the equality (12). 












 n(p, c) = (c – p), (16) 
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  . (18) 
where E is the capital from trading for infinite long period    using equilibrium prices 
c(N) = p(N). The function E() is shown in Figure 2. For  < 0 = N2/(E) the intermediary 
is forced to charge the seller less than it charges the buyer. For  < 20 the average rate of 





















Figure 2. Dependence of trading profitability of its duration. 
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A given rate of trading flow corresponds to each  . In particular the flow which corresponds 
to  = 0 occur when trading is not profitable. For a liner dependence of flow of price estimate 
differential the rate of exchange flow that maximizes profit is two times higher than the rate 
of non-profitable, equilibrium trading. 











  ,  
thus 
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Equation (20) holds for an arbitrary n(p, c). Indeed after substitution of dt with dN the 
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d)()( . (21) 
Equation (20) follows from comparing these two equations. Thus, the optimal trading processes 
are minimal dissipation processes and the condition (14) is the condition of minimal dissipation. 
Extracting maximal profit in a system with a few intermediaries 
We assume that an intermediary operates in a system that is closed with respect to resource. 
Intermediary facilitates the exchange between subsystems in order maximize the amount of 
capital it extracts from the system. The problem here can be decomposed into the problem of 
optimal trading by an intermediary with a single subsystem. The trading is optimal if the 
price c and the estimate p obey the conditions of minimal dissipation (14), (15) for any 
moment when trading takes place. The trading volumes Ni for each of m subsystems are to 










0 . (22) 
We can view a reservoir as one of subsystems with the estimate p- that is independent on its 
stocks of resource and capital. Therefore for any dependence n(c, p-) the optimal price c for 
trading on this market must be time independent. 
Thus, the problem of extracting maximal capital from a closed microeconomic system in a given 
time is reduced to a two staged process. During the first stage m problems (9) – (12) about the 
optimal trading with each of the subsystems with given initial and final resource stocks (Ni0 











max),( . (23) 








,   i = 1, …, m,  
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with  to be found from (22). 





























 . (24) 
The first term in the right hand side is the optimal price at time . The second term is the 
correctional one. It is determined by the averaged sensitivity of the optimal price to the 
volume of trading. The condition of the optimal choice of trading volumes takes the form 
 )( ii Nc  ,   i = 1, …, m. (25) 
Example 
Consider the system where for each subsystem 
 pi = hi/Ni. (26) 
 )(),( iiii pcpcn  . (27) 
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The problem becomes much simpler when all subsystems have constant estimates p = const. 





































































after substitution of *iN  into (28) we obtain Ei(, 
*
iN ) – the maximal amount of capital that 























 .  
After taking into account (31) we obtain for estimates that are independent from resource’s stocks 






 .  
In most of the cases the estimates are reduced when resource stock increases and profitability 
is a monotone convex function of trading (purchasing) time. 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESOURCE-EXCHANGE LAWS BY THEIR 
MINIMAL DISSIPATION CONDITIONS 
The law of resource exchange for an economic system is determined by the function n(x, u). 
The conditions of minimal capital dissipation, (14) and (15), are expressed in terms of this 
function. In this section we will demonstrate that it is possible to single out classes of 
exchange kinetics that have similar optimal trading regimes. 
CONDITION CONSTANT DISCOUNT IS OPTIMAL 





















The estimate p(N) here is the given function. The conditions of optimality for this problem 
have been obtained above. 
Let us find n(p, c) for which the optimal trading price c for any moment of time t is equal to 
the estimate of this resource in the subsystem P up to a constant ((p, c) = c – p = const). From 












F , n(c, p) = 0, c = p. (32) 
It was shown that in order for the optimal discount to be constant it is necessary and 





















This condition determines the exchange kinetics for each dependence  of the optimal price 
on resource estimate. 










 . (34) 
Here M(c – p) and R(p) are arbitrary functions of p and c – p, and M(0) = 0. We denote this 
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This condition determines the optimal discount . The irreversibility of the trading is 













 . (36) 
Equations (35) and (36) determine irreversibility of trading for any function n(c, p) of the form (34). 
CONDITION WHEN OPTIMAL FLOW IS CONSTANT 
The condition of optimality (32) is reduced to the condition that the flow n(p, c) on the 
optimal solution c*(p) is constant when the left hand side of (32) depends on n only 
 )],([),( cpncpF  ,  







, p. (37) 
The following statement holds: the optimal trading is the constant flow trading if and only if 
the resource exchange can be represented in the following form 
 )()(),( pcMpcpcn  . (38) 
Here, M() is an arbitrary non-negative function of price differential. The optimal dependence 






 *)*()*( . (39) 
EXAMPLE 
We define 
 )(arctg),( pcpcn  , c > p.  
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 ,  
where r() is an arbitrary function. We get the equation for n 
 0)(  pc nprn ,   n(p, c) = 0,   p = c. (40) 
The characteristics equation is 
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 1c , )(prp  .  
We get 
 tctc  0)( ,   (p) = t – t0,  (41) 
where (p) is an arbitrary differentiable function such that d/dp = –1/r(p). After elimination 
of t from (41), we get the first integral of the equation (40) 
  00)( ctcp  const.,  
thus the common solution is 
 n(c, p) = M[(p) – c].  
After taking into account that n(p, c) = 0 for c = p we obtain the class of resource exchange 
laws (38) for which it is optimal to trade using constant exchange flow. 
TRADING WITH A NUMBER OF SUBSYSTEMS WITH PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION 
In previous text we considered the problem when an intermediary was able to offer different 
prices to different buyers and sellers. In some cases it cannot do that but has to offer the single 
price to all buyers and another single price to all sellers. Naturally this reduces its profit. 
We denote the prices offered to sellers and buyers as c1(t) and c2(t) correspondingly. The 
composition of trading partners for an intermediary is determined by exchange laws. All 
subsystems at any moment of time t  [0, ] can be divided into three category: sellers (from 
the intermediary) (pi(t) < c1(t)); buyers (pi(t) > c2(t)); and neutral. The intermediary does not 
contact them because it is not profitable for it (c1(t)  pi(t)  c2(t)). 
This problem becomes much simpler when subsystems are reservoirs (have constant 
estimates). In this case c1, c2 and pi are constants that maximise the profit. 









 , (42) 









 . (43) 





pcncpcncs   , (44) 
subject to non-accumulation of resource by the intermediary 
 npcnpcn   ),(),( 21 . (45) 
Equation (45) allows us to express c1 and c2 in terms of n. Substitution of these dependencies 
in (44) leads to unconditioned optimisation problem with respect to n. Substitution of its 
solution n
*




 determine division of the reservoirs into buyers sellers and 
neutral non traders. 
Let us specify the dependencies n 
 )(   pcn  ,  
and rewrite (45) as two equalities 













































































 . (46) 
The objective (44) takes the form 
 max)],(),([ 12  jncincns . (47) 
For fixed n the values of i and j are to be found from the conditions of maximum of c2 and 
minimum of c1, respectively. 












1 . (48) 










p . (49) 
The maximum of (47) on n, subjected to (46), (48) and (49) determines the maximal rate of 
capital extraction in a system with common prices. For a convex s we obtain 
























 . (50) 
For two economic agents (j = 1, i = 2) the problem becomes very simple. The optimal prices offered 
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(t) is determined by these equation for every moment of time t. 
Trading in a competitive market: Let us consider the system where a number of economic 
intermediaries compete to trade with a single finite-capacity economic subsystem in a given 
time (Figure 3). We assume that resource estimate p depends only on its stock N and does not 
depend on the subsystem’s capital. We assume that function p(N) is known. 
The expenses 
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Figure 3. The structure of an economic system with a number of economic intermediaries 
and a finite-capacity subsystem. 










are, for the given trading volume, 
   iii Ndtpcn 

0
, , i = 1, …, m. (52) 






































































































The necessary conditions of optimality become 
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 , i = 1,…, m, (58) 
For given dependence p(N) these conditions, jointly with (55) and (56), determine the optimal 
solution of the problem c(N). 
INTERMEDIARY OPERATING BETWEEN TWO FINITE-CAPACITY 
SUBSYSTEMS 
Until this point we considered trading in a closed economic system. We will now consider 
trading in an open system in a stationary or cyclic regime. 
Economic reservoirs with constant prices 
We consider the system with intermediary which maximizes its profit by trading with two 
economic reservoirs. It can establish contacts with reservoirs in turn by controlling not only 
prices it offers but also the timing of contact. Or intermediary can contact both reservoirs 
simultaneously and trade continuously. We denote the prices (estimates) of two reservoirs as 
p1 and p2, with p1 < p2. Exchange kinetics is given by 
   ppppg , . (59) 
The estimate p here can take to values, p1 and p2, and the prices offered by the intermediary 
for buying and selling p are the unknowns. 
Maximal rate of profit 
The objective of the intermediary is to achieve maximal rate of capital extraction per cycle. 
Sequence of buying and selling 
We now consider the case when intermediary buys and sells from each of the reservoirs 
(markets) in sequence. The rate of profit is 






The intermediary here sells on the second market everything it buys on the first market, 





This is an averaged nonlinear programming problem with one constraint (61). The Lagrange 
function of the corresponding non-averaged problem is 
    ppgpppgL ,,  . (62) 
We denote L as L
0
 for p = p
0
. We require that each of L
0
 attains maximum on p, and get 










v  , v = 1, 2. (63) 
These equations determine the basic values p
*





( 1p ¸ ) and L2
*
( 2p ¸ ). The optimal 
*
 is determined by the condition 
  

 minmax * vv
v
pL . (64) 
Thus, the optimal prices for buying and selling are 
  1**1 , ppp  ,  2**2 ppp  .  
Note that 11 pp   and 22 pp  . 
Suppose that  in (59) depends only on the reservoirs estimate. That is, for p  = 1p ,  = 1 
and for p  = 2p ,  = 2. Then L takes the form 
      ppppL .  
The conditions (63) become 






p , v = 1, 2. (65) 



















































 > 1p , p2
*
 < 2p , the function L2
*
 decreases when  increases. At the same time L1
*
 











 are shown in Figure 4. Their maximum is denoted with bold line. 
The minimum of maxi[L1
*
()] on  is achieved at *. Therefore, 
 
Figure 4. Characteristic dependence of maximum on p1 and p2 of the Lagrange function. 













Substitution of (65) (67) into (61) gives 
















































 ,  (68) 
for 1 = 2, 
*
 = ( 21 pp  )/2. The optimal prices for buying and selling are obtained after 















 .  


















 .  
This is lower than 0 = 12 / pp  - 1, for reversible buying and selling at reservoir prices. 
The limiting rate of capital extraction is 
 
 









 ppN , (69) 
with * to be found form (67). 
One of possible constraints is the average over the cycle flow of capital spent by the 
intermediary to buy resource. This flow is given by the formula 

















U . (71) 




, then the intermediary has to add the 







 then it does not make sense for an intermediary to spend all its 
capital and it will use only its fraction equal to U
*
. Maximum of N here corresponds to the 
maximal rate of profit. 
Simultaneous buying and selling 
For continuous trading the intermediary has to select the prices it offers to buyers and sellers 
p1 and p2 in such a way that it rate of profit 
    11112222 ,, ppgpppgpN   (72) 
is maximal subject to selling everything it buys 
     0,, 222111  ppgppg . (73) 
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This is a standard nonlinear programming problem. Its solution gives the conditions for 
optimal prices 
 























If g = ( p  - p) ( = 1, 2), then the condition (74) takes the form 
 2211 22 pppp  .  
This condition jointly with (73) 
    222111 pppp   ,  





















































N . (77) 
It is easy to see that if  are equal then 
*N  is two times higher than N
*
 in (69). This is 
natural because the exchange flows are the same and selling takes place during half of the 
cycle. If 1  2 then 
*N /N
*
 < 2. 
Vector exchange 
When intermediary contacts reservoirs in turn and there is no constraint of the rate of 










,   0, ppg i , i = 1, …, n.  
This is an average nonlinear programming problem with n constraints. The number of its 
basic solutions does not exceed n + 1. In order to solve it we first solve an auxiliary problem 










,  21, ppp  .  
This problem becomes much simpler if L turns out to be strictly convex on p. The prices 
offered by the intermediary here can be found by solving equations 












0, ,   j = 1, 2,   v = 1,…,n.  
If gi = gi( ip , pi), the problem with vector resource can be decomposed into n independent 
sub-problems similarly to (60) and (61). All the results derived above hold. Note that (67) 
holds here for every i, and the expression (69) for N* contains sum on i. Each term in this 
sum is positive. The profit rate can be found here using the formula 














 .  
The same is true for the problem where intermediary contacts reservoirs simultaneously. 
The characteristic features of vector exchange become important when the rate of capital 
spending is constrained below the value which corresponds to N
*
. This case is considered in 
the next paragraph. 
Intermediary operating between two finite-capacity economic subsystems. 
In intermediary trades with finite-capacity subsystems instead of markets-reservoirs then the 
prices it offers must depend on time. The problem of obtaining the maximal profit here in a 
given time is decomposed into three problems: the problem of optimal trading (optimal 
buying and optimal selling) with a single subsystem, and the problem of adjusting of the 
optimal buying and optimal selling by selecting optimally their common parameters. 
It is important here that buying and selling here obeys the condition of minimal capital dissipation. 
We consider a cycle where resource is first bought by the intermediary and is then sold by it. 
We denote the capacities of two subsystems with which the intermediary trades as C1 and C2. 
These parameters link the stock of resource with its estimate by the subsystem pi(t) (i = 1, 2). 
The estimates are defined as (dpi/dt)Ci = - dNi/dt. The price of the intermediary is denoted 
as p(t). Furthermore, i (i = 1, 2) are the durations of contact between intermediary and two 
sub-systems. It is required here to find such 1 and 2 that the total duration of the trading 
cycle was equal to the given . The other control variable here is the volume of trading N. 
Intermediary maximises its profit per cycle 







dtppgtpdtppgtpI . (78) 
subject to constraint 

















 ,   ii pp 0 , (80) 






Suppose the exchange kinetics is linear 
 
   











Here from the conditions of minimal dissipation it follows that for each of the half-cycles it is 
optimal to maintain the constant flow of resource. As the result the equilibrium prices for 
buying and selling are 










 ,  1,0 t , (83) 










 ,  2,0 t . (84) 
The price offered exceeds p1
*
(t) by 1 = N/(11) and is 2 = N/(22) below p2
*
(t). Thus, 
the prices offered by the intermediary for buying and selling are 









































Substitution of the dependencies (85) into the objective (78) allows calculating the dependence 
of profit on 1, 2 and N, and to find its maximum on these variables subject to (79). We get 


















The first term corresponds to the profit from equilibrium exchange. The second term 
describes losses due to finite time and capacities. 

























































































N . (89) 






































I . (90) 





For simultaneous buying and selling 1 and 2 should be chosen in such a way that the 
following condition holds for any   [0, ] 





111 ,, dtppgdtppg . (91) 
When 1 and 2 increase, the flow of resource in the optimal process decreases. Since the total 
amount of traded resource N during its buying and selling is the same, as a rule 1  2. In 
particular, for linear exchange kinetics, (91) becomes an equality 1 = 2 = . The prices 
offered to sellers and buyers obey (85), and the profit is given by (86) and (85) after 
substituting 1 and 2 with . The optimal profit is 






















































Limiting rate of profit 
If profit M is below I
*
, then the intermediary may want to achieve this profit using minimal 
amount of its capital. The problem becomes 
 
 





















This problem is very similar to the previous problem. The same conditions of minimal 
dissipation must hold here for half-cycles of buying and selling. 
The problem of adjusting these half-cycles takes the form 





















 as above in the problem (87). The 




































N .  
Substitution of N
*
() into (95) gives equation for *. 
Constraints on the rate of spending 
If intermediary is constraint on how much it can spend buying his stock then it is optimal for 




 ,  
the problem is equivalent to maximization of  subject to fixed U or N. 
Consider a cycle when intermediary-monopolist contacts in turns with two markets and the 
exchange kinetic is given by (82). The problem of optimal trading here takes the form 
      max1111122222  ppppppN  , (96) 
with constrained expenses 
   max11111 UpppU    (97) 
and non-accumulation of the resource by the intermediary 
    22221111 pppp   , (98) 
with 1 + 2 = 1, i  0, i = 1, 2. 
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The condition (97) can be rewritten in the following form 




111 22 pppppppp   . (99) 
This condition jointly with (97), (98) determines p1, p2, 1 and 2. 
If buying and selling occur simultaneously then the cost constraint uniquely determines p1 
and p2 and the optimal profit N. For (82) we get 







































UN . (101) 
Optimal choice of trading composition 
If an intermediary can trade in a number or resources (vector exchange) then it can optimise 













max  (102) 
Here Ui are the expenses from purchasing i-th resource. The dependence of Ni on Ui is 
determined by (100) and (101) after substitution of Umax into them. 
If Ni(Ui) are strictly convex functions and their derivatives at the coordinate origin are 






, i = 1, …, n.  



















































with ni ,...1 , iiiii Uppp 1
2
111








Solution of the system (103) determines the optimal composition of the resources for buying 
and their optimal prices. 
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SAŽETAK 
U radu se razmatra proces optimalnog trgovanja u ekonomskim sustavima. Pristup se temelji na uzimanju u 
obzir faktora ireverzibilnosti putem koncepta funkcije bogatstva. 
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